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SETTING THE MORAL TONE IN OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMANDS

A MONOGRAPH
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Infantry

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

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

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ABSTRACT

Setting the Moral Tone in Operational Level Command by Major Jay H. Hale, USA, 54 pages.

This monograph seeks to determine how operational level commanders establish the tone of the command and how they exercise their will through all elements of the command. To establish a context for answering this question, an overview of the strategic environment is conducted. This overview reveals that the United States, when executing the strategy of engagement and enlargement with a shrinking force structure, will rely on the response of all uniformed services and the participation of its allies to meet strategic goals. A review of major actions also demonstrates that the United States historically operates in concert with its allies when conducting operations. The strategic environment is such that U.S. forces will likely operate as a joint team, with multiple services represented in the field and on the commander's staff. Combined operations will be the norm, increasing the complexity of command and control. The next section of the monograph presents such doctrine that exists for senior level commanders. The Army is the only service that has a written doctrine aimed at senior leaders. Other Services have no separate written doctrine for leaders at high levels but are thinking and writing professionally about the unique characteristics of command at the operational level. Using Army doctrine as a framework, the monograph next considers two case studies to see what enabled two senior level commanders to exert their will through multiple layers of command to the individual soldier and to see how the command came to reflect the person of the commander.

This monograph concludes that command of large forces is an increasingly complex endeavor. The addition of other nations' forces with their various motives, capabilities, and biases contributes to the complex nature of the commander's work. Operational level commanders, though experienced and qualified, need a doctrine to guide in this endeavor. A written doctrine would serve as a notice to allied forces of how U.S. commanders will command large forces as well as guide the commander.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I

Introduction

The true general is not a mere prompter in the wings of the stage of war, but a participant in its mighty drama, the value of whose art cannot be tested unless there is a clear possibility of the struggle ending in death.
Major-General J. F. C. Fuller[1]

Operational control of military forces in the field is the purview of commanders in chief of the various unified combat commands. The National Command Authority (NCA), the President and the Secretary of Defense, issues its directives to the commanders in chief through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[2] These unified combatant commands are composed of U.S. combat forces from two or more services and have a broad and continuing mission. The unified commands are the U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Strategic Command.[3] Of these eight, the first five are geographic combatant commands, meaning that they have an area of responsibility defined by the National Command Authority. The other three support geographical combatant commands, or conduct operations of their own in direct support of the

National Command Authority. They are called functional combatant commands.[4]

Combatant commands depend on allocated forces to conduct operations since minimal forces are assigned to the command. As the need for operations develop in an area of responsibility, the regional commands are supported by the Services; each providing appropriate forces. These forces are allocated to the command based on attempts to match needs with capabilities. When he served as the deputy commander in chief of Atlantic Command, General William W. Hartzog described a push-pull relationship between supported commands and supporting commands.[5] Supporting commanders in chief "push" the system by anticipating needs, preparing joint packages that have practiced together jointly, and by articulating capabilities to supported commands. Combatant commanders in chief must articulate requirements couched in terms of capabilities in order to "pull" the appropriate force structure into his region.

In many cases, forces allocated to combatant commanders for the conduct of operations operate day to day under the control of the respective Services. This means that combatant commanders have had little control over the training and preparation of the forces. Two immediate difficulties face the operational level commander receiving these allocated forces. The first is a communication

problem; how to best communicate intent, specific rules of engagement, standards of conduct, and procedural guidance unique to the command. The second is how to establish the moral tenor of the command. Both of these challenges stem from communication problems inherent to large and diverse organizations. One of the factors contributing to the commander's difficulty in this area is the varying backgrounds of the forces allocated. The perspective of the submarine force is not the same as that of allocated air forces or land forces. The use of joint terms and doctrine helps communicate across cultural barriers, but some resistance to clear communication will still occur just by nature of transmission through several layers of command.

Historical precedent indicates that these barriers can be overcome. This monograph will examine two examples and attempt to identify trends that contribute to the successful transformation of a command to become the "commander's command", taking on his personality and values. Though the strategic context will change with time, these trends, founded on doctrinal principles can provide operational level commanders a starting point for future operations involving large forces.

SECTION II

Current Strategic Environment

> The strategic context confronting the United States is unique, and our friends, allies, and interests are worldwide. Accordingly, the arena of our potential operations is the entire planet with its surrounding aerospace, from the ocean depths to geosynchronous orbit and beyond. We must be prepared to defend our national interests in every type of terrain and state of sea and air, from jungles, deserts, and tropical seas to polar ice caps.
>
> Joint Publication 1[6]

The Cold War was a period of "continual tense, alert peace" that affected every aspect of U.S. force structure.[7] As with many wars of history, dramatic change was the result of the end of the Cold War. The global competition between the Soviet Union and the United States once dominated all international relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 ended the careful balance between the two great powers and gave rise to an unstable geopolitical situation that even now continues to evolve. The U.S. force structure responded as it transitioned from a posture designed to defeat the Soviet Union to a posture characterized by a smaller overall force, fewer forward deployed forces, and an orientation toward projection of force from the United States to various regional contingencies.

The bipolar nature of the world with communist countries on one side and democratic countries on the other

mostly dissolved by 1990. The need for a large force forward deployed in overseas areas diminished with the demise of the Soviet threat. However, the United States still realizes the responsibility it has as a global power. President Clinton sees this responsibility also providing multiple opportunities for the United States in terms of increased national safety and prosperity. He intends to take advantage of these opportunities through a strategy of engagement and enlargement.[8]

A strategy of engagement refers to exercising global leadership as the world's premier economic and military power.[9] Preventive diplomacy is a key element of this leadership responsibility. Preventive diplomacy may depend on the military as a tool during execution. The President has identified overseas military presence and interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries as methods to help reduce the potential for crises.[10]

The President uses enlargement to describe the U.S. involvement in expanding membership in the "world community of secure, democratic and free market nations."[11] Accomplishing this enlargement requires robust and flexible military forces. The variety of tasks the President envisions include deterring and defeating aggression in major regional conflicts; providing credible overseas presence; countering weapons of mass destruction, terrorism,

and drug trafficking; and contributing to multilateral peace operations.[12] These tasks require divisions that can quickly deploy, operate across the continuum of military operations, and operate as part of a joint and combined effort.

This strategy of engagement and enlargement is built on three components that also shape the working environment for operational commanders. The three components are: (1) enhancement of national security through a strong defense and effective diplomacy; (2) opening of foreign markets to contribute to the global economy; and (3) promotion of democracy abroad.[13] The United States must maintain its capability to project force abroad in order to accomplish these three components.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a time of significant force reductions within the entire Department of Defense. A reduced threat in Europe and fewer available forces caused the Army to reposition forces to bases within the continental United States. The Army maintained two corps with four divisions, four separate brigades, two armored cavalry regiments, and associated support units in Germany in 1983.[14] By 1996, only one corps remained with two small (two brigades in each) divisions.[15] This shift of forces to the continental United States required the Army to

change its focus to projecting force as part of a joint team.

The National Military Strategy supports this concept as the military forces are directed to "Fight Combined and Fight Joint."[16] The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, asserted, as part of his vision for future operations, that, "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow."[17] Before the fight, however, the Army must rely on other services to get to the fight.

The dependence of the Army on other services for deployment and sustainment is reinforced in the vision of the Secretary of Defense. He envisions early-deploying Army forces moving by air, drawing equipment from prepositioned stocks, and preparing for the arrival of additional forces. These additional forces would arrive by sea (equipment) and air (personnel).[18] The Army acknowledges this dependence and, based on events since 1990, is capable of operating jointly within the strategic context of engagement and enlargement.

Though expected to operate in concert with other Services, each Service has its individual roles and functions. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the

Armed Forces defined core competencies for each service giving the Army responsibility for sustained armored combat for example.[19] The *Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* affirmed the Marine Corps' function of rapid deployment and forced entry capability *as complementary* to the Army.[20] Although some overlap in capability may exist, overall capabilities are meant to be complementary, providing the combatant commanders more options than if there were no areas of overlap. This element of strategic context also establishes the likelihood that combatant commanders will have forces under their command from Services other than their own.

Combatant commanders will not only have forces from various Services to coordinate and employ, but will likely have to coordinate the activities of U.S. forces within combined operations. Combined operations are those operations that involve the forces of various friendly nations. General Shalikashvili's vision again testifies to the increased possibility of working in concert with allied forces. "Although our Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all of our future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must recognize this reality."[21]

The reality of working with coalition partners is not a new experience for U.S. forces. Except for brief interludes, U.S. forces have been employed in conjunction with allied forces since colonial troops fought with British regulars in the French and Indian War (See Table 1).

U.S. Wars and Conflicts

War	Dates	Allies
French and Indian War	1753-1764	Great Britain
War of 1812	1812-1815	
Mexican War	1846-1848	
U.S. Civil War	1861-1865	
Spanish-American War	1889	Cuba
Philippine Insurrection	1899-1902	
World War I	1914-1918	Twenty-seven nations allied with the United States against the Central Powers
World War II	1941-1945	Great Britain, USSR, and twenty-three other nations allied against the Axis Powers.
Korean War	1950-1953	Combat forces provided by fifteen friendly nations and medical units from three others.
Vietnam War	1961-1975	Over forty nations provided assistance.
Grenada Invasion	1983	
Panamanian Invasion	1989	
Persian Gulf War	1991	Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, Egypt, Syria, and France[22] provided major combat forces while a multitude of other nations supported in other ways.

Table 1

A long tradition of working in tandem with other nations does not necessarily mean that combined operations are easier now than they were in previous operations. Dynamics at work during World War I are still apparent in the Persian Gulf War and even in the peaceful intercourse of nations. Combatant commanders must still deal with the agendas of individual nations, national prejudices, national pride, and levels of experience, training, and fervor the allied forces bring to the theater.

SECTION III

Doctrinal Foundation for Senior Level Leadership

> Confronting the inevitable friction and fog of war against a resourceful and strong minded adversary, the human dimension including innovative strategic and operational thinking and strong leadership will be essential to achieve decisive results. Effective leadership provides our greatest hedge against uncertainty.
>
> General John M. Shalikashvili
> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
> Joint Vision 2010[23]

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 *Operations*[24] defines the elements of combat power, or the ability to fight, as maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership.[25] It further defines leadership as the most essential element of combat power. The preeminence of leadership to the other elements is not restricted to the operational level of war but is also applicable to the lowest tactical levels.

Much has been written to guide tactical level leaders as they deal with issues at their level. Official doctrine, books, and articles in professional journals are readily available to the leader at lower levels of command. However, despite the importance of solid leadership at all levels of war, very little doctrine exists to guide officers serving in senior positions.

Doctrine specifically addressed to senior leaders is limited to a few excerpts in joint doctrinal manuals and an

Army Field Manual. A contributing factor in the absence of specific doctrine is the apparent confusion over the issue of the differentiation of leadership and senior level leadership. Some writers assert that leadership should not be categorized by the level of organization being led. They do not talk about senior level leadership but simply leadership in its generic sense.

One such example is General Lawton Collins, who commanded forces in both the Pacific and European theaters in World War II. General Collins presented a speech at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. In his speech, he declared that it never, " . . .occurred to me before that there was any difference in leadership in the smaller units from the leadership required to command large units."[26] He explained that in his mind, the only difference between tactical leadership and senior level leadership was the responsibility a commander at higher levels has to the public.[27]

Though some writers agree with General Collins, there is still disagreement about whether command and leadership should be considered in relation to the level of command. However, Army doctrine categorizes leadership by the level of command and implies that there is a difference in the nature of command depending on the level at which the commander is serving.

The difficulty in finding agreement though, is evident even in the official Army literature. FM 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels identifies two levels of leadership - direct (battalion level and lower) and indirect (brigade and higher).[28] On the other hand, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80 Executive Leadership lists three levels of leadership. It further divides indirect leadership into two separate and distinct levels - organizational leadership (corps, division, and lower) and executive leadership (unified commands and similar organizations).[29]

Regardless of how the Army divides the levels of command, its doctrine formally addresses various levels of leadership and has a doctrinal manual specifically addressed to senior level leaders. FM 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels is specifically tailored for those leaders and commanders in senior level positions. However, the principles indicated for leaders in senior positions do not change from those in the basic leadership doctrine found in FM 22-100 Military Leadership. What changes is the application of those principles. For instance, the focus of FM 22-103 is on presenting a framework for effective indirect leadership.[30]

Inclusion of indirect leadership in the doctrine is the central difference between tactical leadership and

leadership at senior levels. Senior level leaders apply elements of direct leadership but must also be adept at applying indirect leadership within the command. Indirect leadership is the exertion of influence through subordinate commanders and staffs. It is exemplified in team building, shaping future organizational activities, and creating the means to deal with future requirements.[31]

FM 22-103 provides a model for effective senior level leadership. It is portrayed in the form of a wheel.[32] The commander's vision is the central hub from which radiate five spokes or characteristics of effective senior level leadership. These spokes are the characteristics that strengthen the commander's ability to convert his vision to action. They are challenge, ethics, skills, processes, and organization. This list of characteristics should not be used as a checklist for successful leadership but rather a framework for developing future leaders to meet the challenges of command.

Another framework used to develop and evaluate leaders is offered in DA Pamphlet 600-80, *Executive Leadership*. The skills identified in this pamphlet necessary for successful command of large forces are Technical, Interpersonal, and Conceptual. This framework, especially designed for the commander of corps and larger units, will be used along with

various leadership attributes and perspectives to evaluate three case studies later in this paper.

The three elements of this framework are all intertwined and should be considered together as part of an overall system. Technical competency requires an understanding of organizational structuring and the interdependencies between subordinate organizations, and between the organization and the external environment.[33] Commanders must not only understand the organization, but must be able to create new organizational capabilities to meet future requirements. A substantial part of changing an organization is shaping the culture and values of the people assigned to the organization to develop the greatest effectiveness. This gradual shaping of people must be expertly administered using mature interpersonal skills.

Interpersonal skill is another of the critical elements of the framework developed in DA Pamphlet 600-80. Executive level commanders interact with diverse groups and organizations. He must be able to quickly assess the group's character and determine how best to make it function and maximize its contribution to the overall command.[34] Commanders in this environment must have well developed communication skills that include the ability to hear and understand an audience. Communicating with groups is not the only responsibility of the executive level commander.

He must be able to develop subordinates by assessing potential and personal motivations, then working to gain their maximum contribution to the organization. In all these areas, the commander must have and demonstrate personal stamina, part of which is the capacity to operate in uncertain environments and accept calculated risks. At the executive level, commander's interpersonal skills will be tested outside the organization as well as within.[35]

The final element of interpersonal skills the executive level commander must cultivate and develop is what DA Pamphlet 600-80 calls Organizational Representation.[36] The commander will often be competing for resources and support when conducting operations. He must be able to represent the organization to external elements in ways that foster understanding, good will, and support.

The third skill area critical to executive level leaders is that of conceptual and decision skills.[37] The commander must be able to understand his complex organization, guide its progress, and keep it in its proper place within the environment. To accomplish this he needs to recognize his organization as a total system, as well as, its interdependence with other systems. Intense demands for his time require that he must be able to quickly scan for useful information while discarding that which is superfluous. Sometimes, this information is about issues

that the commander has conceptualized, but about which little is otherwise known. All these factors of conceptual skills allow the commander to anticipate future requirements. He can then think proactively, a condition that allows him to retain the initiative, whether against an enemy or in a changing environment.

Though commanders at all levels must be able to see their command as part of the larger environment; the extent to which these competencies are used by senior level commanders is significantly different than those required of commanders at tactical levels of command. General Rommel was noted for his ability to blend direct and indirect leadership in his command style. Author Len Deighton reports in his book *Blitzkrieg* that, "Rommel's lengthy and frequent visits to the front enabled him to make instant decisions about tactics, forcing subordinate commanders to show similar energy and initiative with their units and inspiring lower ranks to extraordinary feats."[38] A chart extracted from DA Pamphlet 600-80, demonstrates the relative importance of each of the critical skill areas to various levels of command.[39] (See Figure 1)

FM 22-103 expands the concept of senior level leadership beyond skill sets required by leaders. It addresses attributes, perspectives, and leadership imperatives that commanders must possess and adhere to.

Three attributes that establish what the commander will be to his organization are his ability to be a standard bearer for the organization, to develop the organization and its members, and to integrate all the parts into a cohesive system. His subordinates expect him to live and defend the tenets of the profession and its key traditions, and to be able to develop subordinate leaders in those same traditions. In other words, commanders who would be standard bearers must be examples in word and deed. True standard bearers develop credibility both outside and inside the organization.



Figure 1

Being a developer is another attribute of senior level commanders. They use every opportunity to teach, coach, and train units and individuals. In the sort of environment where the commander is genuinely interested in developing young, less experienced leaders; subordinates gain a greater freedom to exercise initiative and perform at higher levels than perhaps they could in other environments.

A final attribute of senior commanders is that they are integrators of resources and systems into cohesive teams and efforts. Essential to this attribute is the ability to foresee problems and use personal influence to overcome various difficulties enroute to mission accomplishment. Implied in this attribute is the ability to focus on the future and not be caught up or burdened down with current difficulties.

Commanders who are able to effectively maintain their gaze into the future often do so from historical, operational, and organizational perspectives. Perspective gives the commander a sense of timing when making decisions in rapidly changing situations. It also helps the commander see his organization as part of a larger whole, allowing him to provide guidance that is timely and in context of his environment.

Historical perspective provides insight and a common reference point within the command. It also provides a

sense of scale and proportion to the many and varied professional problems faced by the commander. Without a long-term view, commanders could easily despair by the overwhelming nature of the complex problems he faces. Through history, the commander gains lessons in leadership and strategy that gives confidence in times of uncertainty and that portrays an enduring aspect to his directions.

Senior level commanders also need an operational perspective that is developed from professional study. This perspective is a product of a well-developed set of competency skills that include knowledge of current doctrine and the capabilities of men and machines.[40] This only comes through practice and study of the art of war. Military writers recognized the importance of this attribute of the commander well before the modern age of warfare. The ancient Chinese warrior Sun Tzu said that to ensure success on the battlefield commanders should know the status of their own forces, know the capability of the enemy, and know the terrain.[41]

Finally, the commander must have an organizational perspective. The real thrust of this attribute is to develop cohesive units made up of soldiers ready to act in concert with other soldiers to accomplish assigned missions. An organizational perspective keeps the importance of the soldier in the front of the commander's mind. Without the

soldier maintaining weapons and vehicles, preparing defensive works, or attacking the next objective; the commander could not fight the battles and campaigns that achieve desired end states established by the National Command Authority. Commanders who stay too far removed from the soldiers in the organization risk not having a realistic sense of the capabilities of subordinate units.

Three leadership imperatives that can act as a unifying catalyst are purpose, direction, and motivation. The commander must establish purpose for the command. It allows soldiers in the command to know why they are conducting a particular mission --their part in the big picture.[42] Then the commander provides direction, setting the course for accomplishing the purpose. Plans can change in a fluid environment, but soldiers who share the commander's vision are best equipped to ensure the endstate is met without additional orders.[43] Finally, once soldiers understand the purpose and direction, they need the motivation to move forward and accomplish their mission. Motivation is the moral force that drives men forward into battle and allows opportunity to gain moral ascendancy over the enemy. Developing this motivation is best done before the battle by creating a healthy command climate where leaders are trusted to do the right thing, to make the best decisions.[44]

Essentially, Army doctrine defines three skill sets required for senior commanders - technical skills, interpersonal skills, and conceptual and decision skills. It also identifies various attributes, perspectives, and leadership imperatives that contribute to success when commanders adhere to them. The doctrine is neither a prescription for success nor a checklist for weak men, but fundamental truths that have stood the test of time.[45] Although it is Army doctrine, the principles found in this doctrine are not restricted to Army commanders. These leadership principles have universal application. The Army is the only Service with a written doctrine for senior level leaders, but is not the only Service writing about unique requirements at senior levels.

The United States Air Force and the United States Navy literature speak more of joint leadership and command than senior level leadership. Implied is a relationship of joint command to senior level command. For instance, an article in the Naval Institute Proceedings about General George C. Marshall and joint leadership is essentially an article about senior level leadership.[46] This article is relevant for anyone commanding forces from multiple services.

A 1991 Naval Institute Proceedings article focuses on upper echelon authorities commanding in a multinational environment. It specifies political, strategic,

operational, and tactical levels as interlocking levels of command in coalition warfare.[47] These four levels correspond to the three levels of war the Army defines in FM 100-5 and the relationship they have to politics. Since war does not exist for its own sake but is an extension of policy with military force, the levels of war are inextricably linked to the political realm.[48] As such, these three levels are appropriate in all combat operations.[49]

SECTION IV

Case Studies

Multiple examples are available for study of leadership at senior levels. Field Marshal Sir William Slim who commanded British forces in Burma in World War II, said of senior level command,

" . . . all I tell you is this—that command is a completely personal thing."[50] Perhaps the personal nature of command obviates the application of set principles or tenets to senior level command. Slim's conclusion is that in spite of the personal nature of command, there are essential qualities of great commanders that others should copy and use.[51]

Considering the great captains of history brings to mind several questions. First, how were they able to bind together huge masses of men into effective fighting machines? Secondly, how were they able to exercise their will over that mass to achieve the desired end state? These questions remain relevant in the lethal, joint and combined environment the United States will face in the future. How can a commander who is removed from his troops by several layers of command, facing different Service cultures, and perhaps various language difficulties, hope to make that

command his own? How does he create a shared vision across diverse elements in the command?

Although there are many examples of senior level commanders exercising effective leadership and molding a unit into their ideal, this paper will only examine two. The two case studies in this paper focus on generals who commanded army-level units in the twentieth century. Both examples occurred in world war scenarios. The purpose of looking at these case studies is to determine common features that can provide direction for senior commanders who will direct joint or combined forces.

General John J. Pershing served as the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) during World War I. He was loved and revered by his "boys", the French people he had helped rescue, and the American public who provided the young men.[52] Most importantly, General Pershing created an army of over two million men, and within a year was employing it against the Germans. General Pershing's character and experience proved to be key to successful employment of the AEF.

General Pershing's character developed under the watchful eyes of his father and mother in Laclede, Missouri. His parents' participation in both civic and church affairs, contributed to Pershing's sense of civic responsibility. During the Panic of 1873, Pershing's father came on hard

times and at the age of 13, General Pershing assumed responsibility for running the family farm. He learned a great deal about himself and the value of self-confidence through this experience.[53] At seventeen, Pershing began teaching to supplement the family's income. This experience taught him about instructing, discipline, and people. In 1882, General Pershing quit his teaching job and entered the United States Military Academy.

General Pershing was not very adept at the scholastic work assigned but proved himself more than able in drill, leadership, and discipline. These attributes would be evident throughout the remainder of his military career. Several early assignments served to shape his thinking and helped him develop his leadership values. In 1890, Pershing and the 6th Cavalry were sent to South Dakota to help put down the Ghost Dance Rebellion where nearly 3,000 Indians left the reservations and took refuge in the Badlands. Following the rebellion, Pershing commanded a company of Sioux Indian Scouts. Neither of these experiences did much for his warfighting skills, but both gave him experience in dealing with people of different races and cultures. He would draw on these experiences repeatedly over the next decades.[54]

In 1898, Pershing joined the 10th Cavalry which was preparing for action in the Spanish-American War. The

thirty-eight year old lieutenant seemed well suited for the strain of combat, earning the Silver Star for his actions at San Juan Hill.[55] As regimental quartermaster, Pershing would not normally be in a position to demonstrate the valor worthy of the Silver Star. However, the excitement of the fight drew him to the thick of battle, directing troops to their designated positions for the assault against the hill.[56] Yet again, his experiences in Cuba served as building blocks for the future.

Ever looking for another adventure, Pershing joined American forces occupying the Philippines in late 1899.[57] Pacifying the Moro tribesmen was serious, difficult work requiring officers who were strong but capable of befriending the tribesmen. Pershing described the task as a human problem rather than a military problem and made serious efforts to convince the Moros to accept the American perspective.[58] He became popular among the local tribes, becoming an honorary chieftain.[59] Some of this success stems from his experience with the Sioux and Zuni Indians. His ability to treat others fairly, openly, and pleasantly gained respect and fostered his success.

The winter of 1905 brought a new form of activity in Captain Pershing's life when as a military attach to Japan, he was assigned to serve as military observer to the Russo-Japanese War. This assignment allowed Pershing to learn yet

another culture and race. Here again, Pershing learned many useful lessons in preparation for subsequent command. He was intrigued by what he saw regarding command and control (importance of telephone and telegraph, expanding the battlefield preventing brigade commanders from seeing their entire command), firepower (increased use of artillery, employment of machine guns), and the need for preparedness.[60] In 1906, President Roosevelt commissioned Pershing a brigadier general, a jump over 257 captains, 364 majors, 131 lieutenant colonels, and 110 colonels.[61] His promotion brought with it a reassignment back to the Philippines where he continued to pacify the Moros until 1913.

General Pershing next saw action in Mexico in 1916. The Punitive Expedition lasted from March 1916 to February 1917. Command of the expedition became General Pershing's last tune up prior to World War I. In it, General Pershing learned valuable lessons regarding logistics, aircraft to support military operations, and motorized transportation. The expedition was also useful for testing current equipment. General Pershing's superior performance during the expedition was rewarded by promotion to major general, placing him in position to be chosen to command the American Expeditionary Force in Europe.

General of the Armies John J. Pershing departed the United States in May 1917 enroute to Europe to begin preparations for building his army. By the end of June, the first elements of the army began arriving in France. From the very beginning, Pershing was under pressure to provide replacements to the French and British units that had already taken a beating. He resisted, insisting the AEF be employed as an army. The American Expeditionary Force entered full-scale action in May 1918.

In the year between Pershing's arrival and the employment of his army on the battlefield, much was accomplished. Soldiers arrived in France with little training, ill equipped, and poorly led. Due to the rapid expansion of the army, training camps produced and distributed new officers in a very hasty manner with 57,000 officers commissioned by the spring of 1918. It was over this huge morass that the General of the Armies had to make himself known.

Many soldiers felt the presence of the general immediately upon arrival in France. General Pershing was frequently at the port to greet and inspect the soldiers. In fact, inspection of soldiers' billets, equipment, bivouacs, defensive works, and uniforms was a chief method General Pershing used to exert direct influence over his command. Soldiers of the AEF also felt the general's

influence over their personal lives. General Pershing banned the use of strong liquors and prohibited members of the AEF from visiting places of ill repute, which he formally established as "off limits".[62]

Assessing General Pershing's preparation for and command of the AEF is best done using the framework established earlier in this paper. General Pershing clearly had multiple opportunities to gain technical competence during the growing up years in his profession. Over the years, he saw many complex organizations and observed both internal and external interactions of the organizations. As such, he envisioned a need for a new organizational structure, one created to accomplish his assigned purpose in France.

Although not particularly adept at communicating with large groups of his soldiers, General Pershing very ably represented the United States to many diverse groups that had an interest in the United States' participation in the war. His interpersonal skills, honed in various jobs since his days of commanding Sioux scouts, served him well when dealing with the coalition partners in France.

General Pershing is an exceptional example of a commander embodying critical attributes. He perpetuated the tenets of the profession and its traditions. Donald Smythe describes Pershing's approach to military service as being

of the "old army".[63] He held to the old traditions throughout his military service. This particular attribute of being a standard bearer was a role Pershing filled easily, serving as an excellent example for all his subordinates to follow.

One of the traditions, and another key attribute of senior level leadership, is the responsibility of the leader to develop subordinate units and individuals. General Pershing ensured that soldiers were being trained, even after entering the campaign. Part of this drive to train soldiers was the result of Pershing's belief that they were better off if kept busy.

A final attribute of General Pershing as a senior level commander is that he was an expert integrator. He ably transformed the huge group of new soldiers into a cohesive team - the AEF. During the difficulties of building the AEF, General Pershing kept the focus of his ultimate aim -- to employ the AEF as a cohesive American Army.

This long-term perspective developed from personal experience. General Pershing was not a great student of history and did not seem to draw from historical examples when identifying possible courses of action. Widely varying experiences compensated for his lack of a broad historical knowledge of warfare. The apparent lack of interest in the study of military history is notable when compared to the

voracious appetite of historical material by one of Pershing's aides on the Mexican Punitive Expedition - George S. Patton, Jr.

General George S. Patton, Jr. is the second case study used to examine the role of senior level commanders in shaping their commands. General Patton is useful to this study because of the lasting impression he left on Third Army soldiers. This relationship is reflected even in the names of books written about Patton: *Warrior: The Story of General George S. Patton*[64], *Patton: The Man Behind the Legend*[65], *XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton's Third Army*[66], *Patton's Third Army at War*[67], and *Patton and His Third Army*[68]. Seldom is the Third Army of World War II referred to in the course of conversation except as "Patton's Third Army". Soldiers in Third Army were proud to associate their unit with the name of their commander.

Though removed from the individual soldier by several layers of command, General Patton was still able to transmit his persona to all elements of his command. How he was able to influence the moral climate of the entire Third Army in World War II is of particular interest to this study.

The Third Army, under General Patton's command, was instrumental in the defeat of German forces and the subsequent unconditional surrender of Germany to the Allies. Patton and portions of his staff were a key part of the

deception plan designed to convince Hitler the Normandy landings were a feint, and that the main Allied invasion was to be launched against the Pas de Calais.[69] Although Patton knew his role in the deception plan, the role of his Third Army in the invasion remained vague and was only fully developed after the invasion started.[70] Although the plan for his army was initially vague, Patton was fully prepared for command of the army that would eventually lead the breakout into the heart of Germany.

Patton began his military education with a year of study at Virginia Military Institute while awaiting appointment to the United States Military Academy.[71] He entered West Point in 1904 and should have graduated in 1908. Due to reading problems and difficulty in French and mathematics, he had to repeat his first year delaying his graduation to 1909.[72] His reading problems, though real, exposed a fragile ego that needed constant bolstering. He did not hesitate to appeal to his family for their words of praise and if they did not come with some regularity, he produced "wails of protest."[73] Patton's dyslexia was to be a lifelong companion as was his inflated but fragile ego.

Carlo D'Este reports in his biography of Patton that, "Throughout his life Patton avidly employed any means at his disposal to help advance or influence his career."[74] This seems an odd characteristic in a culture that holds selfless

service as one of its highest values. Patton was careful to cultivate friendships with people who could influence his career, men no less important than Secretary of War Henry L. Stimpson and Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood.[75] He was also careful to keep up appearances of proper social standing.[76] Of course, officers' pay at the time would not allow him the standard of living he desired so he depended on money from his wife's family for his horses, tailored uniforms, and lengthy vacations.[77] Patton not only relied on friendships to ensure advancement, he was also a serious student of war.

While at his first assignment at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, Patton met four days a week with a fellow soldier from his troop for a course of military study.[78] In 1919, after his service in World War I, Patton continued his individual study with a translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*.[79] About that same time, he began studying military problems used at the School of the Line (currently the Command and General Staff College) with Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower.[80] His interest was not limited to historical studies in books but included extensive personal investigation into the characteristics of weapons and equipment.

Patton went to great pains to be tactically proficient so that he could maintain credibility with the soldiers he

led. Patton believed that being an expert swordsman was an essential trait of a great general. As such, early in his career, he began working with the broadsword, fencing epee, and saber; earning the title of Master of the Sword.[81] Later, between World Wars, he and Eisenhower stripped down a tank and put it back together, and experimented with various weapons available at Fort Meade.[82] All these activities contributed as a whole to develop Patton's technical and tactical proficiency. Proficiency in these two areas is only part of the assessment of his service as a commander of a large organization.

Assessing General Patton's command of the Third Army in World War II is best done by observing the framework established in Section III. The first element of the framework, technical competency, is fully reflected by General Patton. He understood organizational structure and was instrumental in designing the tank force for the United States Army. Another clear indication of the grasp General Patton had on this element is that he effectively shaped the morals and values of the members of his command. World War II veterans still talk about being in Patton's Third Army. Much of the credit for his success in molding the climate of the Third Army is due to his personality and interpersonal skills.

DA Pamphlet 600-80 requires that commanders demonstrate interpersonal skills in part by assessing the audience and appealing to that audience for maximum contributions to the cause. General Patton skillfully moved from group to group with his speech, fueling the passions of his army. Much like General Pershing, General Patton used direct influence to gain his desired results. Within the organization he was very successful, unfortunately, General Patton did not fare as well when representing the organization to outsiders.

After one episode of General Patton saying things that got him in trouble, a newspaper editorial essentially declared General Patton unfit for command by saying that, "Whatever his merits as a strategist or tactician he has revealed glaring defects as a leader of men."[83] General Patton's verbal indiscretions even placed General Eisenhower in a position of having to respond forcefully as the Supreme Allied Commander.[84] General Eisenhower preferred to keep General Patton as part of the command chain because, in spite of his indiscretions, he was a war-fighter with great initiative in an environment lacking clear intelligence about the enemy.

General Patton was willing to make tough decisions and even prided himself on being his own operations officer.[85] He personally developed the plans for his army yet encouraged candid dialog prior to issuing the orders. He

did not force the plans on his subordinates but developed a shared vision throughout his army by bringing his corps commanders into the planning process.[86] This process allowed for a greater understanding of the interrelationships within the subordinate commands and aided in integration of the various parts.

The fourth element of the framework developed in FM 22-103 and DA Pamphlet 600-80 is leader attributes. General Patton exemplified the leader attributes. As the standard bearer for Third Army, he carefully paid attention to appearances and avoided things that might make light of service traditions. Patton was also an effective integrator. After observing the failure to integrate the various arms during his service in World War I, he was careful as the commander of Third Army to integrate all the arms into his plans.

Senior level commanders should maintain proper perspective during the conduct of operations. As introduced in Section II, the commander should have an appropriate historical, operational, and organizational perspective. Patton read continuously, developing a broad historical background for his decisions and his particular approach to problems. His personal study also gave him a firm grasp of the science of war and of the capabilities of men and machines. Because he had well developed historical and

operational perspectives on war, Patton was able to shape Third Army into a cohesive organization that reflected his own personality.

SECTION V

Conclusion

Leadership is a personal affair. Field Marshal Slim was correct in his assessment for how could it be otherwise. The leader brings so many variables into the relationship that he cannot help but personalize his leadership. Leaders at lower levels can be produced rapidly and from a common mold. That is why the Army Non-commissioned Officer Education System is a series of leadership schools. Likewise, Army company grade officers attend an Officer Basic Course and Officer Advanced Course to learn the basics of leadership. Yet, there is no school for three and four star general officers who are assuming command of major organizations.

Field Marshal Slim's comment is especially appropriate at the most senior levels of command. A general officer has had years of experience leading soldiers, commanding units, and solving problems. He brings into the command his experience, knowledge, personality, biases, and goals. He can be insulated by several layers of command from the horrors experienced by soldiers in the front line. Consequently, he may be less likely to be swayed in his judgement than the young lieutenant with very little experience who is looking at the faces of the men who will

execute his plan. Although his command is a completely personal affair, there are still some principles that senior level commanders can apply to their situation.

The first conclusion, based on the two case studies, is that the doctrine seems to overemphasize the importance of indirect influence at the senior level. Senior level commanders must seek a healthy balance of direct and indirect influence. Army doctrine indicates that as the level of command increases, the more indirect influence will be used at the expense of direct influence.[87] Both Pershing and Patton made trips to visit front line units nearly every day - to see and to be seen. In turn, the soldiers knew their commanders and had a loyal respect for them. This lesson remains important today even though it is more difficult than either Pershing or Patton faced. In a joint environment, forces under the commander will be less likely to know the commander and it is more difficult to visit the various units because some will be at sea, some forward on the land, and some based rearward ready to strike from the sky.

Another lesson important to senior commanders is that both commanders were respected because they had developed technical skills and professional reputations. They each had substantial individual experience, and their men knew it. General Patton augmented his experiences with

professional reading. Senior level commanders who do not have the technical skills to effectively plan the employment of their forces cannot effectively exert their will on either subordinates or the enemy. Finally, the commander must have a vision for his command.

The leadership imperatives allow the commander to frame his guidance and orders to his subordinates so that they are meaningful. In order for commanders to establish the purpose, direction, and motivation for subordinates, they must be able to exercise the various skill sets identified in Figure 1, Page 18. The leadership imperatives allow the commander to translate his skills, thoughts, and intent into meaningful information.

Even with the assistance of information processing equipment, the task facing senior level commanders is becoming more difficult rather than less. General Pershing and General Patton were concerned primarily with land forces. Senior commanders today face a strategic environment that will likely see joint or combined forces. Commanders who receive forces from services other than their own must contend with overcoming service bias, understanding service cultures, and communicating clearly so that all services can understand. The problems are even more complex when the commander has multiple services under his command and forces from allied nations. He then has to overlay

national agendas over the other problems identified for joint operations. Besides dealing with language difficulties and national agendas, the commander will also have to contend with diverse capabilities. A pre-industrial society will come to the coalition with different capabilities than will a modern industrialized society or an emerging information society.[88] The commander needs to employ all forces in appropriate roles based on individual capabilities; but more importantly, he will have to establish core values for the command.[89]

Command at the highest levels of the Armed Forces is increasing in difficulty with the advent of joint and combined operations as the norm. Developing practical doctrine for the joint force commander could reduce this difficulty. This doctrine needs to provide guidance but it must not stifle the personal nature of command.

NOTES

1 Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, March 1936), 28.

2 *Defense 96, Almanac,* (Alexandria, VA: American Forces Information Service, 1996), 7.

3 As of 30 September 1995, *Defense 96, Almanac,* p. 7. The number of unified commands is not fixed by law but may change at the direction of the President.

4 Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), I-8.

5 John E. Grady, "No More Pickup Games", *Army,* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, July 1994), 33.

6 Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces,* (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 November 1991), 2.

7 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *American Military Power: Future Needs, Future Choices - Background Paper,* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1991), 2-3.

8 President William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996), 1 - 3.

9 Ibid., 11.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 13.

13 Ibid., 3.

14 Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army,* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 575.

15 General William W. Crouch, "Forward Deployed and Projecting Power," *Army Green Book*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, October 1996), 69, 205.

16 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 13.

17 General John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.), Introduction.

18 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), 218.

19 Department of Defense Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense: Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1995), 2-29.

20 Ibid., 2-28 - 2-30.

21 Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, 9.

22 *Microsoft® Encarta® 96 Encyclopedia, s.v.* "Persian Gulf War," (CD-ROM).

23 Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, 28.

24 U.S. Army Field Manuals will be referred to hereafter as FM. For example FM 100-5.

25 FM 100-5 *Operations*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1993), 2-9.

26 General J. Lawton Collins, "Leadership at Higher Echelons," *Military Review* 70, no. 5 (May 1990): 33.

27 Ibid., 44.

28 FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1987), 3.

29 U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80, *Executive Leadership*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 June 1987), 2-8.

30 FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, ii.

31 Ibid., 3.

32 Ibid., 5.

33 DA Pamphlet 600-80, *Executive Leadership*, 52.

34 Ibid., 53.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 51.

38 Len Deighton, *Blitzkrieg*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 212

39 DA Pamphlet 600-80, *Executive Leadership*, Figure 2, 14.

40 FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, 11.

41 Samuel B. Griffith's translation reads, "And therefore I say: "Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total." Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 129.

42 FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, 13.

43 Ibid., 14.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 81.

46 Lieutenant Colonel Jay L. Lorenzen, "Marshall-ing Joint Leadership", *Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1994, 78-79.

47 Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, "Command and Control in the Coalition", *Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991, 74.

48 Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated and edited Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

49 FM 100-5 *Operations*, 1-3.

50 Field Marshal Sir William Slim, "Higher Command in War" (speech presented as part of the Kermit Roosevelt Lecture series to the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 8 April 1952), Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth.

51 Ibid. Slim identified five qualities that he deemed important to command: willpower, judgement, flexibility in mind, knowledge, and integrity. He also said commanders should "Look for the essentials in those commanders (Patton, Montgomery, et al) and copy those."

52 Army Times Editors, *The Yanks are Coming: The Story of General John J. Pershing*, (New York: Putnam, 1960), 59

53 Donald Smythe, *Guerilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), 6.

54 In his thirty-eight years of commissioned service, General Pershing spent a good portion among races and cultures other than his own. Among them were the Zunis and Sioux on the American plains, the Moros during the Philippine Insurrection, the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War, and the French and British in Europe during World War I.

55 Donald Smythe, *Guerilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing*, 52.

56 Ibid., 46-54.

57 Ibid., 61.

58 Ibid., 68.

59 Army Times Editors, *The Yanks are Coming: The Story of General John J. Pershing*, 32.

60 Donald Smythe, *Guerilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing*, 123.

61 Ibid., 125.

62 Ibid., 81.

63 Ibid., 25.

64 Army Times Editors, *Warrior: The Story of General George S. Patton*, (New York, Putnam, 1967).

65 Martin Blumenson, *Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945*, (New York: Morrow, 1985).

66 George Dyer, *XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton's Third Army*. (Baton Rouge, LA: Army Navy Publishing Co., 1947).

67 George Forty, *Patton's Third Army at War*, (New York: Scribner's, 1978).

68 Brenton G. Wallace, *Patton and His Third Army*, (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1981), (reprint of 1946 edition).

69 Carlo D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War*, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1995), 593.

70 Ibid., 597.

71 Roger H. Nye, *The Patton Mind*, (Garden City Park, NY: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1993), 13.

72 Ibid., 14.

73 Ibid., 81.

74 Ibid., 83.

75 D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War*, 130, 138.

76 Ibid., 130.

77 Ibid., 124.

78 Nye, *The Patton Mind*, 26.

79 Ibid., 50.

80 D'Este, *Patton: A Genius for War*, 298.

81 Ibid., 140.

82 Ibid., 295.

83 Ibid., 586. This incident was called the Knutsford Incident and involved remarks General Patton made to a group of ladies in England in April 1944. In his remarks, General Patton intimated that the Americans and the British would rule the post-war world. He further indicated that he was in a hurry to kill more Italians and Germans so he could get on to the task of killing Japanese. His remarks created an uproar.

84 Ibid., 588.

85 Ibid., 596.

86 Ibid., 575, 577.

87 FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, 3. The definition of senior level leadership and command given on page 3 is in part, ". . . the art of reconciling competing demands according to priorities activated by a clearly formed vision . . ." These competing priorities will include the amount of time a commander can spend exercising direct or indirect influence.

88 Peter C. Perdue, "Technological Determinism in Agrarian Societies", *Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism*, ed. Merritt R. Smith and Leo Marx, (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994), 170-196.

89 For example, social mores of various nations and cultures might allow treatment of prisoners or noncombatants that would be detrimental to the cohesion of the command. It is incumbent on the commander to establish a unified approach to potentially divisive issues. See Major General Waldo D. Freeman, "The Challenges of Combined Operations", *Military Review 72, no. 11* (November 1992): 2-11.

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